Trouble makers : Laura Poitras and the problem of dissent by Danchev, Alex
1 
 
Review article 
Trouble makers: 
Laura Poitras and the problem of dissent 
 
ALEX DANCHEV 
 
Citizenfour. Directed by Laura Poitras. 2014.  
The oath. Directed by Laura Poitras. 2010. DVD: £6.99. 
My country, my country. Directed by Laura Poitras. 2006. DVD: £6.99. 
 
Trouble in transit, got through the roadblock 
We blended in with the crowd 
We got computers, we’re tapping phone lines 
I know that ain’t allowed 
Talking Heads
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Most of us can say with some justice that we were good workmen. Is it equally 
true to say that we were good citizens? 
Marc Bloch
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All change in history, all advance, comes from the nonconformists. If there had 
been no trouble makers, no dissenters, we should still be living in caves. 
A.J. P. Taylor
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Laura Poitras is a trouble maker. She is also a film maker. She has the unusual distinction of 
achieving professional recognition in both fields. As the primary contact and conduit for the 
whistle-blower Edward Snowden, the subject of her latest documentary, Citizenfour (2014), 
her status as trouble maker is inextricably intertwined with her status as film maker: her 
preoccupations or vocations have merged. For her recent work she has been garlanded with a 
MacArthur Fellowship, a George Polk Award for national security reporting, and a Pulitzer 
Prize for Public Service. In 2016 she will have an exhibition at the Whitney Museum of 
American Art in New York. To be more precise, ‘she will create an installation of immersive 
environments using materials, footage and information that builds on themes she has been 
exploring in her film making, including NSA [National Security Agency] surveillance and 
post-9/11 America’.4  Poitras has her finger on the pulse of post-9/11 America. The Academy 
Award [was/is] only a matter of time. The Academy [has been bold/has missed its moment] – 
[she won/she should have won] for Citizenfour. 
 
She had been nominated before, for My country, my country (2006), the best documentary yet 
made about the Iraq War. As if to coincide with that nomination, she received another. She 
was placed on a terrorist watch list by the US government. The central watch list is called the 
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). It is kept by the National 
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Counterterrorism Center; the NSA, the CIA, the FBI and other members of the intelligence 
community can all ‘nominate’ individuals to be added to it. Evidently there are at least two 
subsidiary lists relating to air travel: a no-fly list, of those who are not allowed to fly into or 
out of the country, and a selectee list, of those who are earmarked for additional inspection 
and interrogation. As Poitras reveals in Citizenfour, there are said to be 1.2 million people on 
various stages of the watch list, a figure that shocked even Snowden.
5
 She herself had the 
privilege of being a selectee. Federal agents would stop and question her as she was entering 
or leaving the United States. The same thing happened in other countries. In Vienna, she 
relates, ‘I sort of befriended the security guy. I asked what was going on. He said: “You’re 
flagged. You have a threat score that is off the Richter scale. You are at 400 out of 400.” I 
said: “Is this a scoring system that works throughout all of Europe, or is this an American 
scoring system?” He said: “No, this is your government that has this and has told us to stop 
you.”’6 
 
In the US, the questioning was aggressive. Her notes and receipts were rifled, and sometimes 
copied; on one occasion her equipment was confiscated. Once, when she asserted her First 
Amendment right not to answer questions about her work, she was told, ‘If you don’t answer 
our questions, we’ll find our answers on your electronics.’7 She gave as good as she got, 
taking names and recording questions (until deprived of writing materials), protesting her 
treatment, writing to members of Congress, and submitting Freedom of Information requests. 
Over time, she went to ever greater lengths to protect herself and her data, leaving her 
notebooks overseas with friends or in safe deposit boxes, wiping her computers and mobile 
phones clean, taking elaborate precautions with her digital security. Her protestations and 
representations came to nothing. Altogether, she says, she was detained on at least 40 
occasions between 2006 and 2012, often at gun point, without explanation. Poitras is resilient 
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– and not given to self-dramatization – but the endless stop and search felt like a violation. 
She let off steam to the investigative reporter Peter Maass. ‘When did that universe begin, 
that people are put on a list and are never told and are stopped for six years? I have no idea 
why they did it. It’s the complete suspension of due process. I’ve been told nothing, I’ve been 
asked nothing, and I’ve done nothing. It’s like Kafka. Nobody ever tells you what the 
accusation is.’8 The arbitrary nature of the proceedings of The Trial (1925) corresponds eerily 
to the proceedings of the war on terror. ‘Someone must have been telling lies about Joseph 
K., for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine morning.’9 
 
With Laura P., it did not come to that. After six years, Poitras had had enough. She feared not 
so much for herself as for her material: her documents and her films. She took two drastic 
steps. She allowed her friend Glenn Greenwald to write about her case – which was a little 
like letting a highly-trained attack dog off the leash – and she moved to Berlin. No sooner had 
Greenwald’s article appeared in Salon, in 2012, than the airport interrogations stopped, as 
suddenly as they had begun.
10
 In Berlin, Poitras came in from the cold – a nice historical 
reversal. She joined a community of dissident expatriates, including Jacob Appelbaum, a 
‘hacktivist’ from WikiLeaks, who appears in Citizenfour; but she walked by herself. In 
Berlin, she regained her composure and her customary self-containment. ‘Let’s be honest,’ 
she told George Packer of the New Yorker, an old ally. ‘If I had darker skin, or was carrying a 
different passport, the cast of guilt, the shadow, would go a lot longer.’11 Nevertheless, her 
life had changed. For Laura Poitras, security is a lived experience. Privacy is as much an 
instinct as a cause. She is a very private person, but she will never again be a truly private 
citizen. Politically and electronically, she is a marked woman, a target of the national 
surveillance state. Radicalization is something she understands from the inside. 
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Like Errol Morris, but in a different voice, she is also a public intellectual.
12
 She speaks of 
herself as a documentarian – a tribe of rootless cosmopolitans, strong on professional ethics 
and civic obligations – but she is prepared to embrace another identity. In 2014 an 
interviewer asked her what prompted her to become a dissenter. She replied: 
 
It was a response to historical circumstances, particularly the build-up to the Iraq 
War and the prison at Guantánamo. I thought that there was a moral drift, that 
we’d look back on post-9/11 America as a dark chapter in US history. To have a 
prison where people are sent without charges, and then engaging in a pre-emptive 
war against a country that had nothing to do with 9/11 – that seemed like a 
frightening precedent, that we’re going to attack a country because we think it 
might cause us harm in the future. I felt that these were dark times, that I felt 
compelled to say something about it, and that as a documentarian I had skills that 
would help me channel my impressions and thoughts. 
 
At the very least, I would create a historical record. I don’t know if my work 
changed anyone’s opinion. The Iraq War continued for a long time. Guantánamo 
is still open. But I wanted to express something about a drift away from the rule 
of law and basic principles of democracy, to document what was happening. I 
thought I was choosing to make a film about the Iraq War or Guantánamo. When 
I finished My country, my country, the film on Iraq, I was shocked that 
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Guantánamo was still open. It was 2005 when I knew I’d take a broader look at 
post-9/11 America, and that it would probably occupy me for a long time.
13
 
 
The starting point for the film on Iraq was a coruscating article by George Packer on the 
American occupation of that country, ‘War after the war’, sub-titled ‘What Washington 
doesn’t see in Iraq’.14 Packer’s work is a mosaic of many tragedies, large and small, of which 
that experience is composed. What caught Poitras’s eye was the tragedy of Captain John 
Prior, a rifle company commander on his first real-world deployment, as he calls it, who was 
put in charge of a patch of Baghdad: the rectangle of Zafaraniya, a largely Shiite slum in the 
south of the city, home to some 250,000 people. His mission was to improve the 
infrastructure of his patch, and at the same time to guarantee its security. He was also 
responsible for sewage disposal throughout the area occupied by his entire battalion, an area 
with a population of half a million people. Prior is a dedicated officer and a decent man. He 
hopes to make a career in the military. He wants to do something for his country and for the 
country he occupied: he wants to do good. He had mastered counter-insurgency. He had 
studied hearts and minds. He had read some history. He was a stranger to the real world. He 
was bewildered in Babylon. He was not trained in nation building, civil affairs, or sewage 
disposal. 
 
Prior is well-intentioned. If he is not quite Pyle, the original quiet American of Graham 
Greene’s creation, there is a certain family resemblance.15 His mission is beyond him, but he 
has an impregnable belief in the advertisement of American rectitude. Pyle talked self-
righteously of ‘clean hands’. In his own idiom Prior says much the same. He is nothing if not 
hard-working. By day, he chairs the local council and oversees reconstruction projects. By 
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night, he raids homes and searches for suspected militiamen. The raids are fruitless; they 
succeed only in stoking resentment. One vexatious night, Prior’s translator turns to Packer 
and says: ‘Like Vietnam.’ Fifty years on, Saigon spoke eloquently to Babylon. 
 
Packer asked Prior whether his night work threatened to undo the good accomplished by his 
day work. ‘He didn’t think so: as the sewage started to flow and the schools got fixed up, 
Iraqis would view Americans the way the Americans see themselves – as people trying to 
help.’ Packer continues: 
 
But Prior was no soft-shelled humanitarian. He called himself a foreign-policy 
realist. Fixing the sewer system in Zafaraniya, he believed, was an essential part 
of the war on terror. Terrorists depended on millions of sympathizers who 
believed that America was evil and Americans only wanted Middle East oil. ‘But 
we come here and we’re honest, trustworthy, we’re caring, we’re compassionate,’ 
Prior said. ‘We’re interested in them. We’re interested in fixing their lives. Not 
because we have to, but because we can, because we can be benevolent, because 
we are benevolent.’ 
 
Poitras took leave to doubt it. Packer’s question served to crystallize her own thinking. 
Prior’s predicament exemplified the contradictions inherent in the American project as she 
saw it. It was those contradictions that she set out to film. 
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In June 2004 she went to Baghdad and embedded with a civil affairs unit responsible for 
helping Iraqi officials organize the country’s first democratic elections. Courtesy of the 
military, she could move around relatively freely, but she was frustrated to find that the civil 
affairs unit was largely confined to the sanctuary of the Green Zone. Soon after she arrived, 
she went to film an inspection of the notorious Abu Ghraib prison. There she encountered an 
Iraqi doctor, Riyadh al-Adhadh, who was compiling complaints (medical and procedural) 
from the prisoners. Dr Riyadh, a Sunni from the Adhamiya district of Baghdad, turns out to 
be a voluble character and a public-spirited citizen. ‘This is not Vietnam,’ he admonishes his 
US military minders, on camera, a propos the flattening of Fallujah. ‘This is a new century.’ 
Dr Riyadh is a brave man. Adhamiya is a hotbed of anti-American sentiment and insurgent 
activities; in his community, participation in the political process is tantamount to 
collaboration. Nonetheless, he is determined to stand for election to the Baghdad Provincial 
Council. Already an active member of the local council (where nine of his colleagues have 
been killed), he is not enamoured of the existing order. ‘We are an occupied country with a 
puppet government,’ he observes succinctly. 
 
Poitras had found her subject. For the next eight months she embedded instead with Dr 
Riyadh, who courageously invited her to stay at his house, and to visit his clinic. My country, 
my country is a chronicle of that experience. It is an intimate film amid the carnage, 
piercingly human and deeply poignant. It is also an essential document of the war (and the 
war after the war). Like all of her films, it is a self-effacing treatment. Poitras aims for a kind 
of inter-subjective understanding. The documentarian and the doctor are both trouble makers, 
in their fashion; both risk their lives for their principles – for their practice – and so too do the 
doctor’s wife and his six daughters. All of them know this full well. The women of the house 
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are no pushovers. ‘Politics are not good for you,’ Dr Riyadh’s wife tells him briskly. ‘You do 
more good as a doctor.’ 
 
Poitras is her own camerawoman. Her modus operandi is disarming. Typically, she holds the 
camera at waist height and looks down at the viewfinder, rather than hiding behind the lens. 
‘The camera doesn’t have to be a barrier,’ she believes. ‘It’s a witness.’ Her films are eye-
witness accounts: camera-eye witness accounts. She is intensely present, yet unobtrusive; 
even the filming is unobtrusive. The code (or the ethic) may owe something to the exemplary 
documentary filmmaker Frederick Wiseman, whose metier is the study of institutions and 
their inmates, and whose signature is a conscientious austerity and simplicity, as David 
Thomson puts it, eschewing interviews, jump-cuts, narrative or music.
16
 The emphasis is on 
scenes, fades, naturalism and actuality: in Poitras’s words, ‘people, in real time, confronting 
life decisions’. Unlike Wiseman, she concentrates on the inmates, but her films are also 
investigations of institutions of various kinds, above all, the state, the consequences of its 
coercive power, and its moral purpose. 
 
The human predicament is minutely observed – she sticks close to her protagonists, as she 
says – but she manages to retain a space for reflection and disputation, an openness, at once 
ethical and intellectual. Poitras is as empathetic as she is engagée. She is willing to listen. 
There is a stillness to her camerawork whilst she does just that. She encourages us to do the 
same. The effort is worthwhile. Her films are full of unforced insights. In My country, my 
country, Dr Riyadh’s oldest daughter shows Poitras the images of torture and abuse from Abu 
Ghraib on her personal computer.
17
 She goes out to vote, in spite of all, and comes back 
singing the Iraqi national anthem. The title of the film is drawn from the opening words of 
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that anthem. For Poitras, as perhaps for Dr Riyadh, My country, my country is inescapably 
double-edged. 
 
Her next film was to be about Guantánamo. Poitras had the idea of documenting the 
reintegration of a former inmate who had been found innocent and returned to his home 
country. She went to the Yemen, the home country of many inmates of Guantánamo. On her 
second day in the capital, Sanaa, she had another extraordinary encounter. She was 
introduced to a taxi-driver called Nasser al-Bahri, whose nom de guerre was Abu Jandal. 
Once upon a time, Abu Jandal had been Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard, and his ‘emir of 
hospitality’, in Afghanistan (c.1997-2000). What is more, his brother-in-law was exactly 
what Poitras thought she was looking for. Salim Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s driver, had 
spent six years in Guantánamo, where he became both a test case and a cause célèbre, as the 
locus of a legal challenge to the power of the state in the matter of the military commissions 
(the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld), and the first person to be tried under the hastily assembled 
Military Tribunals Act (2006). Salim Hamdan was eventually convicted of providing military 
support to Al Qaeda, but acquitted of terrorist conspiracy. He was transferred to Yemen in 
2008 and reunited with his family the following year. In 2012 his conviction was overturned 
on appeal. Salim Hamdan was famous, and victorious, but also religious. He had maintained 
a dignified silence throughout; in fact he had remonstrated with his interfering brother-in-law 
for talking too much. 
 
Salim Hamdan would be a difficult subject. Abu Jandal, on the other hand, was a gift. He was 
garrulous in the extreme. He was a plausible liar (as Poitras clearly shows). He was a 
charismatic ex-jihadi who had supped with Sheikh Osama, as he called him, and claimed to 
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know personally all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers. He had fought in Bosnia, Somalia, Afghanistan. 
He had grown tired of fighting. He had been troubled by Sheikh Osama’s pledge of loyalty to 
Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader in Afghanistan. He had been incarcerated and interrogated. 
He had been through a government rehabilitation programme. He was counselling young 
Yemenis who might sympathize with Al Qaeda. He was worried about his children, one of 
whom had a bone disease. He had not entirely given up hope of revolution against the evil 
empire: the American colossus. He was a kind of jack-in-the-box. He loved to perform; it was 
difficult to tell when he was performing and when he was not. He was a bad character, or at 
any rate an unreliable one. ‘He was never who you thought he was,’ as Poitras remarked. 
This was not at all the story she had been looking for; it was a story that made her nervous, 
but it was not a story she felt she could ignore. She decided to change tack. She rented an 
apartment in Sanaa and asked Abu Jandal to install a camera on the dashboard of his taxi, so 
that he could be filmed plying his trade, dissimulating with inquisitive passengers, and 
philosophizing, as was his wont. He readily agreed. Abu Jandal is the star of The oath (2010). 
Salim Hamdan is the ghost. 
 
The oath is ambiguous and unsettling, as George Packer has observed. The chief protagonist 
has none of the conspicuous humanity of Dr Riyadh. Abu Jandal is a slippery character, a 
grey zone all of his own. As a documentarian, Poitras is plotless. She is suspicious of the 
constraints of plot, its perfidious consolations. ‘Plot is so relentless. It’s totally unforgiving, 
and it can also be simplifying. It can provide resolution where there should be none. It can 
provide false catharsis.’ For much of this film it seems that she has lost the plot, possibly by 
design. Towards the end, however, a moral unfolds, or perhaps a message. Immediately after 
9/11, we learn, Abu Jandal was interrogated in the Yemen by Ali Soufan, a Lebanese-
American FBI special agent. At the time, Soufan was something of a rarity in the FBI – an 
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Arab speaker (one of eight), a student of International Relations, a subtle mind, and a 
sophisticated interrogator. (In the course of his interrogation of Abu Jandal, he noticed that 
his adversary declined some pastries, because he was diabetic; the next night, he brought him 
some sugarless wafers, a courtesy acknowledged by Abu Jandal.) As chief investigator of the 
sinking of the USS Cole the previous year, Soufan knew as much as anyone about Al Qaeda 
at that juncture. A detailed account of his interrogation of Abu Jandal was published by 
Lawrence Wright in 2006.
18
 It demonstrated beyond doubt that Soufan got Abu Jandal to talk 
– and not merely to talk, but to divulge actionable intelligence, the interrogator’s holy grail – 
without recourse to any ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ or coercion of any kind, but 
rather by playing on weakness, flattery, cunning, and moral suasion. In the film Soufan 
underlines the point: using lawful procedures he gained vital intelligence – the kind of 
intelligence that torture does not yield.
19
 For Poitras, this was the key. ‘Maintaining those 
kinds of principles, you can actually get results, if the end goal is de-escalation of violence or 
de-radicalization.’ That is the message of The oath. 
 
The third in the trilogy of her investigations of American power and purpose after 9/11 was 
intended to bring it home, in more ways than one. Poitras was interested in domestic 
surveillance and the resistance to it. Surveillance and resistance are not easy subjects for the 
filmmaker to engage: there is no there there.
20
 Various strategies have been proposed to make 
visible the invisible. Trevor Paglen, for example, takes ultra-long-distance photographs of 
national security sites (facilities invisible to the naked eye, or impenetrable to the democratic 
gaze); some of his images of the Intelligence Community Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative Data Center, an expansionist development in Utah, are incorporated 
in Citizenfour. Poitras for her part focuses on the human. ‘The historian is like the ogre of the 
fairy tale,’ wrote Marc Bloch. ‘Where he smells human flesh, there he finds his quarry.’21 As 
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with the historian, so with the documentarian. She began filming Julian Assange, in England; 
Glenn Greenwald, in Rio de Janeiro; Jacob Appelbaum, in Berlin; and a retired cryptanalyst 
and mathematician named William Binney, in Maryland, home of the National Security 
Agency. Binney had worked for the NSA man and boy. In that community he was a 
legendary figure; he has been described as one of the best analysts in history. He resigned as 
Technical Leader for Intelligence in October 2001, soon after he had concluded that the NSA 
was heading in an unethical direction. Binney was outraged at the NSA’s failure to foil the 
9/11 plot. He believed that he and his team had developed a system called ThinThread that 
could solve the agency’s basic problem – it was overwhelmed by the amount of digital data it 
was collecting. ThinThread was rejected in favour of a rival approach, unwisely christened 
Trailblazer, built by private contractors. In 2006, Trailblazer was abandoned as a $1.2 billion 
flop. Meanwhile, in the wake of 9/11, and under pressure from the White House, the 
directorate of the NSA sanctioned an extensive programme of warrantless domestic 
surveillance. The programme was developed in secret. Binney was not ‘read in’, but some of 
his people were; from the reports he received, he became convinced that it employed a 
bastardized version of his brainchild, stripped of privacy controls. Binney was all in favour of 
monitoring, code breaking, data mining, and signals intelligence – he had spent a professional 
lifetime trying to perfect such techniques – but he was fundamentally opposed to what he saw 
as illegal, unconstitutional, unaccountable, unjustifiable and indiscriminate spying on 
American citizens, not to mention the corruption and malfeasance that he thought had led to 
this debacle. 
 
So did a copper-bottomed patriot and doyen of the secret world turn whistle-blower. William 
Binney is an unlikely trouble maker, but an unbeatable source. He is old enough to remember 
Watergate and ‘Deep Throat’ (later revealed to be Mark Felt), the source for Carl Bernstein 
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and Bob Woodward, the investigative reporters of the Washington Post. He alludes to this 
history in a cameo appearance in Citizenfour. The lineage of dissent is well-learned by the 
dissenters. 
 
Poitras made an Op-Doc about him, The Program (2012), for the New York Times.
22
 Op-
Docs are shorts, the filmic equivalent of op-eds. Binney explains his position, with sweet 
reason, making light of the risks he is taking – he mentions in passing a raid on his house, by 
heavily armed FBI agents, one of whom pointed a rifle at his head as he emerged from the 
shower. It was left to Poitras to spell out the seriousness of his situation in an accompanying 
article: ‘He is among a group of NSA whistle-blowers, including Thomas A. Drake, who 
have risked everything – their freedom, livelihoods and personal relationships – to warn 
Americans about the dangers of NSA domestic spying.’23 
 
The Program became a taster. One of its many on-line viewers was Edward Snowden, who 
was already familiar with Poitras’s work and something of her personal history. In January 
2013 he emailed her, anonymously, using the alias Citizenfour. ‘I am a senior member of the 
intelligence community,’ he told her, with pardonable exaggeration. ‘This won’t be a waste 
of your time’. He asked for her encryption key. She gave it to him. She was hooked. So was 
he. 
 
They embarked on a kind of crypto-courtship. Each wanted to establish the bona fides of the 
other: to find a basis of trust. Poitras was afraid of entrapment. ‘I don’t know if you are legit, 
crazy or trying to entrap me,’ she wrote. Snowden (still anonymous) was afraid of exposure 
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and arrest, or worse, before he had even begun. He was also afraid of being ignored. ‘I’m not 
going to ask you anything,’ he replied. ‘I’m just going to tell you things.’24 He needed 
Poitras, in order to do what he had to do; he knew that he would have to convince her to take 
him seriously. He had already tried and failed with Greenwald, who had not troubled to 
install the necessary encryption software for them to communicate securely, despite repeated 
nudges from Snowden. Poitras was sound on security; tradecraft was meat and drink to her. 
Still she seemed suspicious. Ultimately, that was all to the good, as Snowden recalled: 
 
We came to a point in the verification and vetting process when I discovered that 
Laura was more suspicious of me than I was of her, and I’m famously paranoid. 
The combination of her experience and her exacting focus on detail and process 
gave her a natural talent for security, and that’s a refreshing trait to discover in 
someone who is likely to come under intense scrutiny in the future, as normally 
one would have to work very hard to get them to take the risks seriously. With 
that putting me at my ease, it became easier to open up without fearing the 
invested trust would be mishandled, and I think it’s the only way she ever 
managed to get me on camera. I personally hate cameras and being recorded, but 
at some point in the working process, I realized I was unconsciously trusting her 
not to hang me even with my naturally unconsidered remarks. She’s good.25 
 
Poitras was in deep, and she knew it. ‘It clearly pulled me in in every way – emotionally, 
psychologically. Unlike my previous films, this was somebody I had built a dialogue with, 
and wanted to meet. Because I cared.’ Much to her surprise, after three months of emailing, 
Citizenfour informed her that he would not seek to remain anonymous once the story broke 
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and his treasure-trove of documents were in the pipeline to the public domain. ‘I’m not 
cleaning the metadata,’ he wrote. ‘I hope you will paint a target on my back and tell the world 
I did this on my own.’ Her immediate response was that she wanted to meet and that she 
wanted to film. Citizenfour was horrified. ‘It’s too dangerous, and it’s not about me – I don’t 
want to be the story.’ ‘Like it or not,’ she replied, ‘you’re going to be the story, so you might 
as well get your voice in.’ That argument carried the day.  ‘After that,’ she told Packer, ‘I 
became a filmmaker.’ 
 
And yet it was not quite as simple as that, as Poitras herself clearly recognized. The Snowden 
case, or rather the Poitras case, is the paradigm case of the participant-observer. Like it or not, 
she had become an actor in her own drama. Indeed, she was in some sense the moving force – 
the director – without any idea of the identity or proclivity of her pseudonymous leading man. 
This gave rise to a number of urgent questions, practical and ethical. Unlike Michael Moore, 
for example, Poitras never filmed herself conducting interviews or interacting with others; 
that would violate the code of the documentarian. When she filmed Snowden she would have 
need of an accomplice. Happily, Snowden himself was of the same mind. He urged her to 
find a collaborator to publish the documents and explicate their meaning, not a simple task. 
His preferred choice for this key role was Greenwald – an inspired choice, as it turned out, 
despite the technical hiccoughs. 
 
The rest of the story reads like le Carré crossed with Kafka, as the New York Times put it. 
Snowden transited from Hawaii to Hong Kong, with four laptops and little else, apart from 
nearly two million highly classified documents, a world record. Poitras recruited Greenwald. 
Greenwald enlisted the Guardian. (He was then a Guardian columnist, semi-detached.) 
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Shadowed by Ewen MacAskill, the paper’s respected Washington correspondent, they 
decamped to Hong Kong. En route they browsed in the cache of documents that Citizenfour 
had entrusted to Poitras. Among them was an impassioned self-declaration, written specially 
for them. It concluded as follows: 
 
Many will malign me for failing to engage in national relativism, to look away 
from [my] society’s problems toward distant, external evils for which we hold 
neither authority nor responsibility, but citizenship carries with it a duty to first 
police one’s own government before seeking to correct others. Here, now, at 
home, we suffer a government that only grudgingly allows limited oversight, and 
refuses accountability when crimes are committed. … When officials at the 
highest levels of power, to specifically include the Vice President [Dick Cheney], 
are found on investigation to have personally directed such a criminal enterprise, 
what should happen? If you believe that investigation should be stopped, its 
results classified above-top-secret in a special ‘Exceptionally Controlled 
Information’ compartment called STLW (STELLARWIND), any future 
investigations ruled out on the principle that holding those who abuse power to 
account is against the national interest, that we must ‘look forward, not backward’ 
[as President Obama said], and rather than closing the illegal program you would 
expand it with even more authorities, you will be welcome in the halls of 
America’s power, for that is what came to be, and I am releasing the documents 
that prove it. 
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I understand that I will be made to suffer for my actions, and that the return of 
this information to the public marks my end. I will be satisfied if the federation of 
secret law, unequal pardon, and irresistible executive powers that rule the world 
that I love are revealed for even an instant. If you seek to help, join the open 
source community and fight to keep the spirit of the press alive and the internet 
free. I have been to the darkest corners of government, and what they fear is light. 
Edward Joseph Snowden
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Characteristically, Snowden gave them precise instructions for their rendezvous: a conference 
room on the third floor of the Mira Hotel, by a plastic alligator; he would be carrying a 
Rubik’s Cube (unsolved). They were to have an exchange about the hotel food, and then to 
follow him. After a certain stutter – they were too early, he was too young – they arrived in 
his room. Without further ado, Poitras proceeded to set up her camera. In a matter of minutes 
she was ready. ‘I’m going to begin filming now,’ she announced quietly, and so it began. 
 
She filmed for some 20 hours, over eight days. This is the core of Citizenfour: the encounter 
with Snowden in hiding; making and breaking the story in the same breathless moment. In 
short order Greenwald produced a series of incendiary articles, and Poitras produced a trailer, 
‘NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden’, a video on the Guardian website.27 It is this 
extraordinary set-up – people, in real time, confronting life decisions, with a vengeance – that 
makes the full-length film so compelling: at once thriller and fable; a chamber piece (a 
bedchamber piece) and a political event of tremendous significance; a model of cinéma vérité 
and in its own peculiar way almost an ideal speech situation. Citizenfour is riveting. So is 
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Edward Snowden. He sits on the bed, tense but collected.  He speaks in sentences, sometimes 
in paragraphs. He is cogent, principled, realistic, modest. There are flashes of wit, self-
knowledge, even self-irony. The modus operandi is as understated as ever. Poitras’s empathy 
does not fail her: it matches Snowden’s integrity.28 
 
She was surely right to intuit that he was genuine, in every sense, notwithstanding persistent 
attempts to demonize, psychologize, or trivialize, fitting him for the standard repertoire of 
stock characters for which dissenters are always fitted: traitor, narcissist, ‘useful idiot’.29 
Motivations are often tangled, as Dostoevsky observes in Crime and punishment: ‘Sometimes 
actions are performed very skilfully, most cleverly, but the aims of the actions and their 
origin, are confused, and depend on various morbid influences.’30 That may be true of 
Snowden, as of others, but there is no sign of it. ‘If there was a Zen prize for whistleblowers, 
Snowden would win without trying,’ as Andrew O’Hagen has remarked: ‘he checks and 
labels everything, he thinks out the moral, he cross-references and relates the material to 
possible future outcomes. Most of all: he let his name come out for the sake of veracity and to 
put a human face to the leaks, then he aimed to disappear and say little and profit nowhere, 
letting the story be bigger than him.’31 Like Daniel Ellsberg, one of his exemplars, he 
depended on the moral proposition. ‘Americans must look past options, briefings, pros and 
cons, to see what is being done in their name, and to refuse to be accomplices,’ Ellsberg 
argued, Snowden-like, in 1971. ‘They must recognize, and force the Congress and President 
to act upon, the moral proposition that the US must stop killing people in Indochina’.32 
 
In truth, trouble makers like Laura Poitras and Edward Snowden have done the state some 
service. Dissenters are model citizens. As A. J. P. Taylor and J. M. Coetzee remind us, they 
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are traduced at the time, and vindicated by posterity.
33
 ‘After all,’ another great dissenter has 
written, ‘we have gotten used to regarding as valor only valor in war (or the kind that’s 
needed for flying in outer space), the kind that jingle-jangles with medals. We have forgotten 
another concept of valor – civil valor. And that’s all our society needs, just that, just that, just 
that! That’s all we need and that’s exactly what we haven’t got.’34 
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